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A TRIBUNAL’S MANIFEST EXCESS OF POWERS:  
AN EXAMINATION OF BIT PRECLUSION 
By 
Melody Mahla* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
Faced with a financial crisis in 1989, Argentina instituted several 
privatization efforts in an attempt to resuscitate its floundering national economy.1 
A second fiscal downturn forced the Argentine government to rescind these 
privatization schemes in 2001.2 Sempra Energy International (“Sempra”), an 
American company that had capitalized on Argentina’s economic revitalization 
attempts by investing in several of Argentina’s natural gas providers, challenged 
Argentina’s bailout efforts and invoked arbitration proceedings, insisting that 
Argentina had violated the Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) between Argentina 
and the United States.3 The arbitrational tribunal (“Tribunal”) agreed and issued a 
$75 million award in Sempra’s favor.4 On January 25, 2008, the Republic of 
Argentina (“Argentina”) submitted a request with the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) for the annulment of the Tribunal’s 
award.5 In its request for annulment, Argentina insisted that the Tribunal had been 
improperly constituted, had “manifestly exceeded its powers,” had violated a 
fundamental procedural rule, and had failed to provide an adequate explanation for 
its decisions.6 Upon ICSID’s granting of a provisional stay of enforcement of the 
                                                 
* Melody Mahla is a 2012 Juris Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University 
Dickinson School of Law. 
1 Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the 
Argentine Republic’s Request for Annulment of the Award of June 29, 2010 (Mr. Christer 
Soderlund, Sir David A.O. Edward, QC, Ambassador Andreas J. Jacovides) [hereinafter 
Sempra]. 
2 See id. at 7. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 Id. at 1. 
6 Sempra at n.1 at 8. 
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Tribunal’s Award, an ad hoc committee was convened to deliberate over 
Argentina’s annulment application.7 In ultimately determining that the Tribunal 
had “made a fundamental error in identifying and applying” the relevant law, the 
ad hoc committee held that the Tribunal had exercised a “manifest excess of 
powers” and annulled its Award.8 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY 
 
 In 1989, Argentina implemented a privatization scheme in an effort to 
stimulate its struggling economy.9 Coupled with this initiative was the 
Convertibility Law of 1991, which afforded the Argentine peso (“ARS”) a one-to-
one exchange rate with the United States Dollar (“USD”).10 In effect, the 
privatization program incentivized the reorganization of Argentina’s natural gas 
industry in 1992, resulting in the creation of several major residential and 
commercial gas distributors.11 Sempra, an American corporation, invested in two 
of these newly formed Argentinean gas companies, Sodigas Pampeana and 
Sodigas Sur, and acquired 43.09% of both distributors’ shares.12 These particular 
companies controlled 90% and 86.09%, respectively, of shares in two Argentine 
companies, Camuzzi Gas Pampeana S.A. and Camuzzi Gas del Sur (together, 
“Licensees”), which were conferred licenses for the provision of natural gas in 
1996.13  
 Faced with yet another financial crisis in 2001, the Argentine Government 
acted quickly to ratify the Emergency Act of January 2002, essentially dissolving 
the Convertibility Law of 1991 while simultaneously phasing out the USD and 
                                                 
7 See id. at 1. 
8 Id. at 44. 
9 See id. at 6. 
10 See id. 
11 Sempra at n.1 at 7. 
12 See id.  
13 See id. 
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reintroducing an ARS-based economy.14 Sempra took exception to many of 
Argentina’s bail-out measures, asserting that the revocation of the “Licensees’ 
entitlement to calculation of tariffs in USD and their semi-annual adjustment on 
the basis of the US Producer Price Index (“PPI”)” was tantamount to a “wholesale 
abrogation and repudiation of significant rights and entitlements” that the 
Licensees and Sempra had enjoyed under Argentina’s previously privatized 
regulatory environment.15 Consequently, Sempra filed a Request for Arbitration 
under the ICSID Convention, “invoking the US-Argentina Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (“BIT”)” on September 11, 2002. 16 Argentina raised various jurisdictional 
objections; however, the ICSID Tribunal ultimately determined that the dispute 
was indeed governed under ICSID’s jurisdiction.17 
 The Tribunal issued its Award on September 28, 2007, holding that 
Argentina had “breached the fair and equitable standard” along with the “Umbrella 
Clause” of the BIT and issuing damages to Sempra.18 More specifically, the 
Tribunal first determined that the Licensees’ rights and designations warranted 
their entitlement to calculate the PPI adjustments that Argentina had disallowed.19 
The Tribunal next decided that Sempra enjoyed a right to maintain its calculation 
of tariffs in USD – a “central feature of the tariff regime” that Argentina had 
discontinued.20 The Tribunal then held that while Argentina had not explicitly 
breached the “standard of protection established in Article VI(1) of the BIT”, its 
newly adopted measures (circa 2001-2002) had “substantially changed the legal 
and business framework under which [Sempra’s] investment” was made.21 As 
such, the Tribunal held that Argentina had violated the “fair and equitable 
                                                 
14 See id. 
15 Id. 
16 Sempra at n.1 at 7. 
17 See id. 
18 Id. 
19 See id. 
20 Id. 
21 Sempra at n.1 at 7. 
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treatment standard of Article II(2)(a) [and the Umbrella Clause] of the BIT.”22 
Objecting to this decision, Argentina submitted a request for annulment, along 
with a stay of enforcement of the Tribunal’s award, on January 25, 2008.23  
The award was “provisionally stayed” on January 30, 2008, upon which an 
ad hoc committee (“Committee”) was convened to consider Argentina’s 
annulment application.24 In response to Sempra’s request to “lift the stay of 
enforcement” of the Tribunal’s award, the Committee decided to continue the stay 
until its hearing of the parties’ oral arguments on December 8, 2008.25 On March 5, 
2009, the Committee prolonged the stay of enforcement of the Tribunal’s award, 
stipulating that Argentina place $75 million USD in escrow.26 According to this 
ruling, if Argentina failed to fulfill this requirement within 120 days, Sempra could 
request that the stay be terminated.27 On May 13, 2009, after Argentina neglected 
to offer any sort of escrow agreement, Sempra asked that the Committee lift the 
stay.28 Finally, after numerous disputes between the parties regarding various 
attachment risks and contingencies, the Committee “terminated the stay of 
enforcement” of the Tribunal’s award and “dismiss[ed] Argentina’s argument that 
the placing of funds in escrow . . . would cause prohibitive cost[s] and create an 
‘unacceptable risk of attachment to Argentina.’”29 After months of deliberation, the 
Committee finally issued its “Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Request for 
Annulment of the Award” on June 29, 2010. 
                                                 
22 Id. at 10-11. 
23 Id. at 8. 
24 Id. at 1. 
25 Id. at 2. 
26 See Sempra at n.1 at 2. 
27 See id. 
28 See id. at 4. 
29 Id. at 5. 
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III. THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS 
 
A.  The Argentine Republic’s Arguments 
 
 Argentina raised four separate arguments in its application for 
annulment.30 First, Argentina contended that the Tribunal had been improperly 
constituted under Article 52(1)(a) of the ICSID Convention.31 Argentina then 
insisted that the Tribunal had “manifestly exceeded its powers” in violation of 
Article 52(1)(b) of the ICSID Convention.32 Third, Argentina argued that the 
Tribunal had seriously departed “from a fundamental rule of procedure” in 
violation of Article 52(1)(d) of the ICSID Convention.33 Finally, Argentina 
maintained that the Tribunal’s award failed to identify the reasoning behind its 
provisions as required under Article 52(1)(e) of the ICSID Convention.34  
Argentina’s primary claim asserted that the Tribunal had “committed a 
manifest excess of powers” in its failure to apply Article XI of the BIT in its 
analysis.35 In essence, Argentina argued, the Tribunal’s determination that 
Argentina’s economic distress could not properly be classified as a “state of 
necessity under customary international law,” (Article 25 of the International Law 
Commission (“ILC”) Articles) led to an impermissible failure to “undertake further 
judicial review under Article XI” of the BIT.36 Here, Argentina asserted, the 
Tribunal overlooked the significant differences between Article XI of the BIT and 
the “state of necessity under customary international law.”37 Those differences 
                                                 
30 See id. at 8. 
31 See Sempra at n.1 at 8. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See id.  
35 Id. at 19. 
36 Sempra at n.1 at 19. 
37 Id. 
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involve the “nature, . . . operation, . . . content, scope, . . . and effects” of Article XI 
of the BIT as a “special conventional rule” and the “state of necessity” as a 
“general rule.”38 As such, the “state of necessity” is subordinate to Article XI of 
the BIT.39 Argentina asserted that the Tribunal made “manifest errors of law in 
equating Article XI of the BIT with the state of necessity under customary 
international law” –mistakes that are “sufficiently serious” to constitute a 
“manifest excess of powers in accordance with Article 52(1)(b) of the ICSID 
Convention.”40  
 Argentina also argued that in failing to recognize the “self-judging nature” 
of Article XI of the BIT and refusing to “perform a substantive review” of 
Argentina’s financial measures, the Tribunal demonstrated a “manifest excess of 
powers.”41 Argentina insisted that the Tribunal incorrectly substituted Article XI of 
the BIT with the “state of necessity under customary international law,” and 
neglected to acknowledge the fundamental operational, contextual, and 
consequential differences between the two doctrines.42 According to the 
Argentinean government, Article XI of the BIT was applicable to its actions to 
restore its economy’s financial solvency in 2001-2002.43 Given Article XI’s self-
judging nature, the Tribunal had a “duty to defer to Argentina’s decision to take 
measures to maintain public order and protect its essential security interests.”44 The 
Tribunal’s failure to adhere to this duty constituted a “manifest excess of powers” 
and thus rendered its award subject to annulment.45 
 Argentina next contended that the Tribunal’s award warranted annulment 
because it did not explicitly delineate its reasoning pursuant to Article 52(1)(e) of 
                                                 
38 Id. at 20. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 21-22. 
41 Sempra at n.1 at 22. 
42 Id.  
43 See id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 23. 
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the ICSID Convention.46 First, Argentina claimed, the Tribunal did not explain 
why it relied exclusively on “the requirements of the state of necessity under 
customary international law.”47 The Tribunal also did not establish its grounds for 
equating Article XI of the BIT with Article 25 of the ILC Articles.48 The Tribunal 
vaguely reasoned that the “lack of a definition of ‘essential security interests’ of 
Article XI of the BIT led to the application” of Article 25 of the ILC Articles, 
however, it failed to explain why.49 As such, inferred Argentina, the Tribunal did 
not disclose its reasoning behind its award decision, as required by Article 52(1)(e) 
of the ICSID Convention, and its determination was therefore subject to 
annulment.50 
 
B. Sempra Energy International’s Arguments 
  
 Sempra maintained its initial rejection of Argentina’s assertions and 
insisted that the Tribunal did not engage in a manifest excess of powers through its 
disregard of Article XI of the BIT.51 Sempra argued that the Tribunal’s 
interpretation of Article XI of the BIT was appropriate and that its determination 
that “Argentina had means available other than the Emergency Law to address its 
economic crisis” was proper and correct.52 According to Sempra, the Tribunal’s 
conclusion that Article XI lacked the requisite clarity for application to the 
circumstances at hand was well founded.53 In fact, Sempra asserted, the Tribunal 
provided several explanations regarding its interpretation of Article XI of the 
                                                 
46 See Sempra at n.1 at 23. 
47 Id. 
48 See id.  
49 Id. at 24. 
50 See id. 
51 See Sempra at n.1 at 24. 
52 Id. 
53 See id. 
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BIT.54 First, the Tribunal stressed that the BIT’s “object and purpose” necessitated 
a “narrow interpretation of Article XI.”55 The Tribunal next reasoned that Article 
XI lacked a definition of the terms “essential security interests” or “necessary.”56 
The Tribunal then explained that “Article XI reflect[ed] customary international 
law” and that the use of applicable international rules of law is appropriate when 
BIT provisions are unclear, undefined, or indicative of “customary international 
law.”57 Thus, according to Sempra, the Tribunal properly rejected Argentina’s 
defense stemming from Article XI of the BIT for two primary reasons. First, the 
hastily enacted Emergency Law was not necessary to “maintain ‘public order’ or 
protect Argentina’s ‘essential security interests.’”58 Second and most importantly, 
“there were other means available” to achieve these economic goals.59 Attributing 
to the Tribunal the task of determining “whether the Emergency Law was the 
‘only’ alternative to address the economic crisis,” Sempra indicated that the 
conclusion of the Tribunal suggested that Argentina had failed to supply 
“‘convincing evidence that the events were out of control or had become 
unmanageable.”60 Sempra went further to maintain that the Tribunal, in concluding 
that Argentina itself had contributed to its economic crisis, had based its Article XI 
finding on a “general principle of law.”61 
 Sempra acknowledged that more specific “‘treaty regime[s]’ should 
‘prevail over more general rules of customary law,’” yet maintained that because 
the text of the BIT failed to offer the Tribunal with adequate guidance, the 
Tribunal had appropriately “considered customary international law” the most 
apposite means to “interpret the BIT provision.”62 While Article XI of the BIT is 
                                                 
54 See id. 
55 Id. 
56 Sempra at n.1 at 24. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 24-25. 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 25. 
61 Sempra at n.1 at 25. 
62 Id. at 26. 
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restricted to “maintenance of peace, ‘essential security interests,’ and public 
order,” Article 25 of the ILC Articles requires that the issue at hand “be an 
‘essential interest of the State.’”63 According to Sempra’s explanation of the two 
laws, Article XI of the BIT “is not more expansive than customary law.”64 Sempra 
insisted that rather than simply refraining from the application of Article XI, the 
Tribunal had “interpreted the provision as requiring a State invoking it to satisfy 
the same conditions as required to invoke the plea of necessity under customary 
law.”65 In its analysis of the applicability of Article XI, the Tribunal determined 
that the circumstances under which Article XI can be invoked are identical to 
“those required by customary international law.”66 According to the Tribunal, 
Sempra argued, Argentina had simply failed to submit evidence proving the 
existence of those conditions. “No excess of powers, let alone any manifest excess 
of power [was] involved.”67 
 Finally, Sempra maintained that Article XI is not self-judging and that the 
Tribunal had provided adequate, “lucid, and consistent” reasons for its 
determinations.68 As indicated by Sempra, the Tribunal’s explanations “clearly 
show[ed]” the reasoning behind its four major conclusions.69 First, the Tribunal 
decided that Article XI failed to provide or describe the “legal elements and 
conditions necessary for its application.70 Second, the Tribunal reasoned that the 
review of equivalent or comparable “rules of customary law” was compulsory in 
this instance.71 Third, the Tribunal found that the lack of clarity in Article XI of the 
BIT required a review of whether a pertinent application of “state of necessity 
                                                 
63 Id. at 27. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 28. 
66 Sempra at n.1 at 28. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Sempra at n.1 at 28. 
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under customary law” was used.72 Finally, the Tribunal concluded that both 
statutes were “customary” and essentially interchangeable.73 
 
IV. THE COMMITTEE’S HOLDING AND REASONING 
 
 The Committee ultimately determined that the Tribunal’s award should be 
annulled in its entirety based upon its exhibition of a “manifest excess of powers” 
(in violation of Article 52(1)(B) of the ICSID Convention) in its decision regarding 
the inapplicability of Article XI of the BIT.74 While the Committee acknowledged 
the mootness of Argentina’s other contentions, given its acceptance of Argentina’s 
primary argument insisting upon the Tribunal’s exercise of a “manifest excess of 
powers,” it agreed to address these other contentions “for the sake of 
completeness.”75 
 In analyzing Argentina’s “serious error of law” claim, the Committee 
recognized that a “serious error of law is not in itself a ground for annulment under 
Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention” unless it is of an “egregious nature.”76 
Here, however, the Committee’s conclusion that the Tribunal had committed a 
“manifest excess of powers” precluded any inquiry regarding error as to the 
application of relevant law.77 In addressing Argentina’s claim regarding the lack of 
reasoning for the Tribunal’s award, the Committee indicated that it was clear that 
the Tribunal had endeavored to provide a “detailed account of its reasoning” 
regarding “necessity under customary international law.”78 The Committee, in 
considering the Tribunal’s deliberation process, determined that the Tribunal had 
allotted an appropriate amount of attention to the comparison between Article XI 
                                                 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 29. 
75 Id. 
76 Sempra at n.1 at 29-30. 
77 Id. at 30. 
78 Id. 
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of the BIT and Article 25 of the ILC Articles.79 As such, the Tribunal’s conclusion 
that Article 25 represents a “fair expression” of customary law and that the 
Article’s stipulated conditions were necessary for “invoking an ‘essential security 
interest’ under the BIT” was sufficiently reasoned.80 The Tribunal’s explanation 
regarding the applicability of the “criteria found in customary international law,” 
given the BIT’s failure to address the required legal components for the 
“invocation of a state of necessity,” was clear and explicitly stated.81 Rejecting 
Argentina’s contention regarding the self-judging nature of Article XI of the BIT, 
the Committee held that the Tribunal appropriately disregarded Argentina’s 
discretion in its attempt to preserve public order and “protect essential security 
interests.”82 
 Despite Argentina’s multiple failed contentions, the Committee affirmed 
its claim that the Tribunal had impermissibly failed to apply Article XI of the BIT 
and, as such, had engaged in a “manifest excess of powers” – an offense that 
rendered the Tribunal’s award annullable.83 According to the Committee, where a 
BIT supplies the pertinent treaty language, “it is necessary first and foremost to 
apply the provisions of the BIT.”84 As such, the BIT represents applicable law and 
must not be overlooked.85 Article XI of the BIT indicates that the “Treaty shall not 
preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance 
of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace or security, or the [p]rotection of its own 
essential interests.”86 
                                                 
79 See id. at 31. 
80 Id. at 30-31. 
81 Sempra at n.1 at 31. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 32. 
84 Id. at 40.  
85 See id. 
86 Sempra at n.1 at 40. 
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In considering the language of the BIT, the Committee determined that the 
treaty is not expressly self-judging on its face.87 The Tribunal had contradicted 
itself in its interpretation of Article XI by acknowledging the ability of an 
economic emergency to be included within the context of Article XI yet denying 
the Article’s self-judging nature.88 According to the Committee, the Tribunal did 
not even “deem itself to be required, or even entitled, to consider the applicability 
of Article XI.”89 The Tribunal’s reference to and use of Article 25 of the ILC 
Articles as an example of customary international law and guidance as to the 
proper interpretation of terms within the BIT was reasonable.90 However, it was 
neither equitable nor sensible for the Tribunal to use Article 25 to effectively 
preempt Article XI of the BIT.91 
 The Committee also struck down the Tribunal’s decision to equate Article 
25 with Article XI.92 A direct comparison of the Articles demonstrated material 
differences, and as such, Article 25 certainly should not have been used as 
guidance in the Tribunal’s interpretation of the terms used in Article XI.93 “The 
most that can be said is that certain words or expressions are the same or 
similar.”94 While it is certainly true that “the BIT does not prescribe who is to 
determine whether the measures in question are or were ‘necessary’ for” the 
salvaging of Argentina’s floundering economy (i.e. whether Article XI is “self-
judging”), if the “measures in question are properly judged to be ‘necessary,’ then 
there is no breach of any Treaty obligation.”95 
                                                 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 Id. at 41. 
90 See id. 
91 See Sempra at n.1 at 42. 
92 See id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 44. 
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 Typically, an “excess of powers” claim is properly supported where it is 
alleged that the Tribunal failed to apply to relevant law.96 The Committee found 
that the following sentence of the Tribunal’s award demonstrated the Tribunal’s 
failure to consider and apply the appropriate law: 
 
Since the Tribunal has found above that the crisis invoked 
does not meet the customary law requirements of Article 25 
of the Articles on State Responsibility, it concludes that 
necessity or emergency is not conducive in this case to the 
preclusion of wrongfulness, and that there is no need to 
undertake a further judicial review under Article XI given 
that this Article does not set out conditions different from 
customary law in such regard.97 
 
In effect, the Tribunal held that Article 25 effectively “trumps” Article XI with 
regard to the “mandatory legal norm” that must be applied in such a 
circumstance.98 As such, the Tribunal essentially embraced Article 25 of the ILC 
Articles as the proper applicable law, in a complete dismissal of Article XI of the 
BIT. In doing so, the Tribunal “made a fundamental error in identifying and 
applying” the relevant law.99 This error, a failure to recognize and employ the 
proper controlling law, “constitutes an excess of powers within the meaning of the 
ICSID Convention.”100 
 This determination alone, however, did not require the annulment of the 
Tribunal’s award.101 The Committee held that in order for an “excess of powers” 
                                                 
96 Sempra at n.1 at 44. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Sempra at n.1 at 45. 
FOREIGN DECISIONAL LAW ON ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 
 
445 
claim to necessitate annulment, the excess must have been “manifest.”102 In this 
case, the Tribunal’s conclusion that there “‘[was] no need to undertake a further 
judicial review under Article XI’” was an obvious dereliction of the Tribunal’s 
duty to inquire sufficiently as to the Treaty’s applicability.103 The Tribunal formed 
this determination on its baseless assertion that the language of the BIT was 
“somehow not legitimated by the dictates of customary international law.”104 
 In conclusion, the Committee determined that because of the Tribunal’s 
exercise of a “manifest excess of powers,” its award was subject to annulment 
under the ICSID Convention.105  The Committee expressly annulled the Tribunal’s 
award and ordered Sempra to reimburse Argentina for its total ICSID 
expenditures.106 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The case of Sempra Energy International v. Argentina is a prime example 
of the importance of a tribunal’s thorough analysis and resulting application of 
relevant law, particularly where an existing BIT provides pertinent language 
regarding the settlement of potential disputes. The annulment of such a large award 
due to rather easily avoidable substantive errors imposes hardship on both parties. 
Furthermore, this case demonstrates the necessity of a check on the powers of 
arbitration tribunals. The convening of an ad hoc committee allows for an 
impartial review of a tribunal decision and enables an independent decisional body 
to identify any glaring errors or abuses of discretion. This measure grants losing 
parties a course of redress in response to a tribunal’s improper granting of an 
award. Furthermore, establishing a supervisory entity within ICSID steers the 
review of a tribunal’s decision away from the courts, essentially preserving 
                                                 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 46. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 47. 
106 Sempra at n.1 at 48. 
YEARBOOK ON ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 
 
 
446 
arbitrational authority and avoiding any exacerbation of the already tenuous 
relationship between arbitral tribunals and the courts. 
